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credibility of the deposit insurance fund backing the 
claims.3
In some cases, host countries of foreign branches 
might prefer home country regulation and supervision 
if the home country’s deposit insurance scheme is 
strong and if the branch is large relative to its banking 
group. In this case, the home authorities might be more 
worried about potential spillovers from the branch into 
the banking group that they would be responsible for. 
Still, a banking system where large foreign branches 
are important might be more exposed to fluctuations in 
financial intermediation that are not easily dealt with 
by host policymakers. If the home country’s deposit 
insurance scheme is weak, then exposure to large for-
eign branches is clearly a material risk for the host 
authorities. To avoid such risks, supervisors often favor 
the legal form of a subsidiary. For instance, New Zea-
land requires foreign banks to be incorporated as sub-
sidiaries (IADI 2011).
When financial stability is threatened, the inter-
ests of stakeholders from the home and host countries 
of cross-border banks often come into conflict. The 
agency problems that arise from competition among 
regulators can have crucial implications for the resolu-
tion of distressed institutions, the magnitude and dis-
tribution of costs coming from potential failures, and 
the externalities created (Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2008; 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006). Schüler (2003) argues 
that the conflicts typically arise in two dimensions: a 
home country dimension and an international dimen-
sion. The home country dimension is related to princi-
pal/agent problems between bank supervisors and 
taxpayers. These may be reflected in insufficient capi-
tal requirements or regulatory forbearance, most nota-
bly when financial institutions become distressed. 
More importantly for the issues we are discussing, in 
the international dimension, Schüler (2003) argues that 
when foreign banks increase their market share 
through branches (rather than through subsidiaries), 
host country regulators are faced with a loss of super-
visory and regulatory power over the risks their country 
truly faces. This makes regulation, supervision, and 
resolution more challenging in countries with a sub-
stantial foreign bank presence, especially if branches 
are the main legal form. Host authorities are tempted 
to protect their own citizens, even at the expense of cit-
izens from the home country or from other host coun-
tries, given that they are typically also responsible for 
financial stability (Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2008). At the 
same time, the home country regulators and supervi-
sors might have difficulties in identifying (and acting 
upon) the externalities that a failure may create in the 
host countries. All these tensions are not easy to resolve 
and present challenges to cross-border integration. 
3  Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2008) note that “When a large number of foreign 
branches from different home countries coexist in a host country, bank cus-
tomers in that country may encounter a wide variety of different insurance 
plans. These plans are likely to differ, at times significantly, in terms of ac-
count coverage, premiums, insurance agency ownership (private vs. govern-
ment) and operation, ex ante funding and credibility.”
One recent example of how the conflicts between 
home and host authorities can shape the outcome of a 
financial crisis comes from Iceland (Allen et al. 2011). 
Immediately after Lehman Brothers collapsed, three 
large internationally active Icelandic banks failed. 
These banks had adopted aggressive growth strategies 
in the preceding years, relying on the collection of inter-
net deposits through foreign branches and subsidiaries 
(IADI 2011). Depositors in these banks were thus subject 
to a wide array of home and host oversight and deposit 
insurance arrangements, which were not easily grasped 
by depositors. The Icelandic insurance fund was not 
able to immediately reimburse depositors of the failing 
banks, requiring the adoption of emergency funding 
agreements with institutions from other countries. This 
episode made clear the importance of close integration 
between deposit insurance and resolution authorities, 
most notably when dealing with large internationally 
active banking groups (IADI 2011). It also showed that 
depositors in foreign branches may be unprotected if 
the parent bank is unable to protect the branch opera-
tion (and if the home country deposit insurance scheme 
or, ultimately, the sovereign backing it up, is not strong 
or credible enough). 
THE CREDIBILITY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
While depositors are more likely to react to differences 
in deposit insurance during a crisis (Bonfim and Santos 
2019), these differences may be relevant even in normal 
times, especially for larger depositors with cross-bor-
der operations. Huizinga and Nicodeme (2002) show 
that international depositors react to differences in 
national deposit insurance policies. International 
depositors (e.g., large firms) prefer to place their funds 
in countries with explicit deposit insurance, most nota-
bly if the deposit insurance schemes have co-insur-
ance, private administration, and a low deposit insur-
ance premium. These results suggest that countries 
can alter the design of their deposit insurance protec-
tion to capture a larger share of the market for interna-
tional deposits, thus leading to international competi-
tion in deposit insurance. 
As we will discuss later, the current state of the 
banking union in Europe ensures that rules and regula-
tions on deposit insurance are, albeit with some poten-
tial heterogeneity, common across the entire European 
Union, thus eliminating the scope for competition 
across jurisdictions based on depositor protection. 
However, even though the rules apply across the EU, 
fiscal responsibility is still national. That means that in 
the event of a bank failure, depositors in a given coun-
try will be reimbursed by the domestic authority, unless 
their deposits are held in a foreign branch, in which 
case depositors are insured in the home country of the 
branch’s parent bank. This has certain implications: 
Bonfim and Santos (2019) show that during the euro 
area sovereign debt crisis, Portuguese depositors took 
action in response to the perceived credibility of the 
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Deposit insurance is one of the pillars of trust in the 
banking system. This trust is deeply anchored in the 
belief that the sovereign stands ready to reimburse 
depositors in case of a bank failure. What does this 
mean for banks operating across different coun-
tries? Are differences in the design and protection of 
deposit insurance behind some banks’ reluctance 
to expand across borders? Can these differences be 
explored to attract depositors with heterogeneous risk 
preferences? 
In this article we discuss these issues, focusing 
especially on the current situation in the European 
Union. The euro area sovereign debt crisis, with its 
onset in the early 2010s, paved the way for a strong 
political consensus on strengthening the financial inte-
gration dimension of the European project. Today there 
is a single banking supervisor and a single resolution 
mechanism. But the banking union will remain incom-
plete until an agreement is reached on a common 
deposit insurance scheme. Looking into the current sit-
uation in Europe can thus be an important exercise in 
better understanding what is special about deposit 
insurance for cross-border banks.
Of course, the implications of this discussion go 
beyond the European debate. That said, heterogene-
ous deposit insurance guarantees are possibly even 
more challenging for banks that operate across other 
jurisdictions where further legal and financial differ-
ences coexist. 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AROUND THE WORLD
For many decades, deposit insurance was seen as an 
undebatable institution in advanced economies and as 
a synonym of progress and financial development in 
emerging markets. Since Diamond and Dybvig (1986) 
showed how deposit insurance was crucial to prevent 
bank runs, no one questioned the need to offer this pro-
tection to depositors. The only open debate on this 
topic was about whether the existence of deposit insur-
ance made banks riskier, as depositors had fewer 
incentives to actively monitor banks. Most of the exist-
ing literature supports this view (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detagriache 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2004; 
Ioannidou and Penas 2010; Karas et al. 2013), though 
there is also evidence to the contrary (Martinez Peria 
and Schmukler 2001; Lamer 2015). Anginer et al. (2014) 
1  The opinions expressed in the article are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of Banco de Portugal or the Eurosystem. Any errors 
or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.
reconcile these opposing perspectives, finding that 
before the global financial crisis, ample safety nets 
coming from deposit insurance induced excessive 
risk-taking, while during the crisis these schemes were 
a pillar in safeguarding financial stability. 
Despite the prevalence of deposit insurance as 
an institutional pillar, there is substantial heteroge-
neity in its design (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2001; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2004; Beck and Laeven 
2006; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015). This has important 
implications. For instance, Huizinga and Nicodeme 
(2002) show that international depositors are sensitive 
to differences in national deposit insurance policies. 
Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2008) discuss the flaws in 
decentralized deposit insurance schemes in the US and 
how these offer important lessons for European poli-
cymakers. Hardy and Nieto (2008) show that uncoordi-
nated deposit insurance policies around the world can 
lead to insufficient supervision and excessive deposit 
insurance.
BRANCHES VERSUS SUBSIDIARIES: WHAT DOES IT 
MEAN FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE?
Given the heterogeneity in the design of deposit 
insurance around the world, there are key implica-
tions for cross-border banks. When a bank expands 
across borders, a crucial decision needs to be made: 
will the bank operate as a branch or as subsidiary? 
For the bank’s day-to-day operations, that decision 
does not entail major consequences. The customers 
of a foreign bank will most likely be unaware of the 
legal status of their bank—unless something goes 
wrong. In a recent paper, Bonfim and Santos (2019) 
show that during a crisis, bank depositors seem to be 
well aware of the differences between a branch and a 
subsidiary. Indeed, in financial distress, the distinc-
tion is not trivial. While a subsidiary is a fully-fledged 
legal entity in the country where it operates (the host 
country), a branch does not have legal autonomy from 
the parent bank. If a subsidiary fails, the host author-
ities are responsible for dealing with the process. The 
supervision of a subsidiary is typically the responsibil-
ity of the host, even though the home authorities are 
responsible for supervising the consolidated banking 
groups. The same is usually true for resolution pow-
ers and for deposit insurance. In the European Union, 
if a subsidiary fails, the host deposit insurance fund 
is responsible for reimbursing insured depositors. 
This situation is quite different from branches: host 
country supervisors have some power when dealing 
with branches, but these are quite limited. Most of the 
responsibility falls to the home authorities, including 
in matters of deposit insurance.2 Against this back-
drop, depositors in a given country may face differ-
ent levels of protection, depending on the design and 
2  Even though the host authorities might also choose to offer additional 
deposit insurance to depositors in branches of foreign institutions.
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THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: WHERE DO WE 
STAND TODAY AND WHY?
In the European context, and in the euro area in particu-
lar, the lack of common deposit insurance was only one 
element characterizing the modest degree of risk-shar-
ing stemming from the banking system, in the context 
of a common currency. 
Since the onset of the crisis, the nonexistence of a 
European banking union was widely acknowledged as 
a clear threat to the economic and financial stability of 
Europe, essentially because it contributes to a strong 
relationship between sovereigns and the banking sec-
tor. This threat is amplified in times of crisis and poses 
significant challenges to financial stability, as well as to 
the design and transmission of the common monetary 
policy.  
The banking union initiatives that emerged in 2012 
represent an important step for the completion of the 
economic and monetary union. The centralized char-
acter of bank supervision ensures proper and consist-
ent oversight of multinational banks. It also reduces 
the capacity of sovereigns and banks to influence each 
other, in particular as regards strategic decisions 
related to international expansion. A single bank reso-
lution system, demanding coordination among the var-
ious resolution authorities, also makes the resolution 
of cross-border institutions more feasible, while being 
a first step towards avoiding the involvement of coun-
tries (or taxpayers) in the recapitalization of banks and 
in the activation of deposit guarantees. This may con-
tribute to mitigate the fragmentation of financial and 
banking systems along national borders. Still, the three 
pillars upon which the banking union was supposed to 
be designed—common supervision, resolution of trou-
bled banks, and deposit insurance—are still incom-
plete. The lack of a common deposit insurance scheme, 
together with the possibility of liquidation of banks 
according to national law, leave room for disturbances 
in the event of a crisis, and significantly affect the incen-
tives for authorities at the EU level in terms of risk trans-
fer and maintaining financial stability.
That is, even though banks are now supervised and 
resolved at the European level, the ultimate conse-
quences and responsibilities regarding a bank failure 
are still eminently national. If a bank with cross-border 
activities fails within the EU, the host authorities will be 
called to protect depositors in subsidiaries, and home 
authorities will have to deal with deposits held at 
branches. One recent example where the conflicts were 
evident was the distressed acquisition of Banco Popu-
lar Español in 2017. If the bank had failed instead of 
being purchased by Banco Santander, the Portuguese 
deposit insurance scheme would have had to reim-
burse, if necessary, deposits held in the Portuguese 
subsidiary, even though the decisions concerning the 
supervision and resolution of this subsidiary were not 
made in Portugal, but at the European level (Nouy 
2017). Given the heterogeneity across sovereigns, the 
national character of the guarantees contributes to the 
differentiation of deposits across member states. In 
times of crisis, this can generate financial fragmenta-
tion, which runs counter to the objectives of the bank-
ing union.
Despite these evident problems, the ongoing Euro-
pean debates concerning the deepening of the banking 
union (and crucially, a possible common deposit insur-
ance system) are marked by a clear tension between a 
group of member states calling for urgent risk-sharing 
solutions and another group calling for the immediate 
application of decisive risk-reduction measures (reduc-
tion of NPL and of the exposure to the respective sover-
eign), ensuring that those insurance mechanisms do 
not become essentially redistributive at the outset. 
While efforts to stabilize the banking systems in more 
vulnerable countries are widely recognized, there 
seems to be a failure, on both sides, to find an adequate 
balance between ambition in the degree of risk reduc-
tion and recognition of the substantial benefits of a 
more complete banking union. More than that, there 
seems to be a failure to recognize that facing the next 
crisis without a complete banking union could jeopard-
ize the future of the economic and monetary union. 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?
The mix between centralized supervision and resolu-
tion on the one hand, and national deposit insurance 
and liquidation on the other, creates a clear misalign-
ment of incentives among the various authorities. It is 
up to national authorities to deal with the outcome of a 
resolution or liquidation determined by a European 
decision. Member states thus bear the ultimate respon-
sibility regarding financial stability, but are clearly con-
strained by supervisory and resolution (or no resolu-
tion) decisions. This means that European authorities 
might not internalize the costs of determining the 
potentially disruptive liquidation of a bank by national 
authorities and the associated activation of deposit 
guarantees. Deciding at the European level not to apply 
a resolution measure and, as a consequence, determin-
ing the liquidation of banks at the national level, may 
thus be more likely without a common deposit insur-
ance scheme, possibly leading to local systemic 
disruptions.
But again, the lack of a common deposit insurance 
scheme is not the only challenge in the European insti-
tutional design to promote financial stability and 
cross-border banking integration. A deepened banking 
union would also require a common resolution fund 
(which is already in place) but with a truly credible 
backstop and the internalization, at the EU level, of the 
costs of bank liquidation. A European institution could 
perhaps make the jurisdiction of origin less relevant if it 
met certain requirements. Specifically, it should have a 
high degree of autonomy and independence from 
national governments, sufficient resources to tackle a 
systemic crisis, and responsibility over the resolution, 
sovereigns backing up the deposit insurance schemes. 
This is shown by examining depositor behavior around 
the periods in which a few foreign subsidiaries operat-
ing in Portugal changed their legal status to foreign 
branches, thus implying that deposits were no longer 
guaranteed by a distressed sovereign, but by highly 
rated European countries. As discussed later, this 
shows that as long as the banking union is incomplete, 
the perceived heterogeneity of deposit protection 
across jurisdictions cannot be overcome. 
The strength and credibility of the home countries’ 
deposit insurance schemes and the absolute and rela-
tive size of the banks in each country are key determi-
nants of the effectiveness of regulation and supervision 
and, ultimately, of financial stability (Eisenbeis and 
Kaufman 2008; Eisenbeis 2004). One key issue behind 
such strength and credibility of deposit insurance are 
the funding arrangements. Before the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established in the 
US, there were several attempts to create decentral-
ized deposit insurance schemes.4 Between 1908 and 
1917, eight US states created deposit insurance 
schemes, most of which failed within a very short 
period. According to Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2008), 
these schemes had several design flaws in common: i) 
the schemes were typically underfunded; ii) they were 
undiversified, having their risk concentrated in specific 
regions and usually with significant exposure to one or 
two large institutions; iii) governance was poor, espe-
cially in the case of privately funded schemes; and iv) 
there was a failure to recognize that the credibility of 
the insurance mechanisms was based essentially on 
the willingness and credibility of the funding entity to 
honor its commitments if needed. As discussed later in 
this article, these flaws may still be a threat in the cur-
rent design of deposit insurance in the European Union. 
For instance, smaller countries with concentrated 
banking systems are more likely to experience chal-
lenges to the credibility of deposit insurance compared 
to larger and more diversified economies. 
A DECADE OF CHANGE IN EUROPEAN DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE
Before the failure of Lehman Brothers, all member 
states had their own deposit insurance schemes. The 
existence of deposit insurance was indisputable and 
debate over a common deposit insurance scheme was 
nonexistent. Indeed, the overall regulatory landscape 
was far from integrated. The Second Banking Directive, 
published in 1988 and modified in 1995, established 
three basic principles: harmonization, mutual recogni-
tion, and home country control. Regulatory rules were 
generally harmonized, ensuring a minimum set of com-
mon rules, mostly focused on bank capital. Mutual rec-
4  The FDIC, established in 1933, was one of the world’s first deposit insur-
ance schemes to be sponsored by a central government. Its creation was the 
result of the lessons learned from more than 10,000 bank failures in the US 
between 1929 and 1933 (Eisenbeis and Kaufman, 2010).
ognition meant that member states would have to 
reciprocally recognize and honor each other’s regula-
tions. Finally, the Directive specified that the home 
country would take precedence over the regulation 
and supervision of the host country. After the enact-
ment of this Directive, any EU bank had the option of 
establishing branches anywhere within the EU without 
requiring approval from the host authorities. However, 
if banks decided to expand across borders within the 
EU through subsidiaries rather than through branches, 
the host country would be responsible for the regula-
tion and supervision of that legal entity (while the 
home supervisor would still be responsible for super-
vision of the consolidated banking group). This had 
direct implications for deposit insurance: deposits in 
branches were insured by the home countries, while 
deposits in subsidiaries were insured by the host 
countries.
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015) show that, since the 
global financial crisis, deposit insurance around the 
world has become more widespread and its coverage 
has become more extensive. Europe is no exception: 
Ireland was the first country to react after Lehman 
Brothers failed, increasing the deposit guarantee cov-
erage and later adopting a full guarantee on banks’ 
liabilities. In the days and weeks that followed, most 
member states adopted measures to foster depos-
itors’ trust. By October 7, 2008, the EU’s Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) decided that 
it was necessary to adopt common rules, leading to 
the revision of the Directive on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes. Ten years on, the rules are generally harmo-
nized across Europe, thus limiting the scope for con-
flicts of interest between home and host authorities. 
In fact, the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
approved in 2014 attempts to further harmonize 
national deposit insurance schemes, guaranteeing 
deposits up to EUR 100,000 (per credit institution 
and per account holder). Borrowing/lending between 
national funds is also envisaged in the Directive, which 
provides a crude form of risk-sharing, limited to liquid-
ity insurance. Still, the degree of heterogeneity across 
national deposit guarantee schemes permitted by 
this Directive can be relevant in some dimensions. 
This may contribute to the differentiation of deposits 
across national borders and hence to financial frag-
mentation in times of crisis. 
A key question is whether these common rules 
on deposit insurance, backed by common supervision 
and resolution, are enough to align incentives among 
authorities in different member states and to promote 
cross-border banking. As we shall argue below, the 
result of these tensions may continue to prevent the 
emergence of truly European banks, which could in 
itself provide a substantial degree of private risk-shar-
ing across the monetary union. In other words, the 
nature of deposit insurance for multinational banks 
in Europe is one factor that influences the way banks 
expand (or refrain from expanding) internationally. 
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ance, emergency liquidity assistance, or in a context of 
liquidation. Take the provision of emergency liquidity 
assistance, for example: without restrictions on the use 
of the funds at the group level, national central banks 
could be funding deposit outflows in another jurisdic-
tion. This could occur even with intrinsically sound sub-
sidiaries that are affected by problems generated in the 
parent bank only indirectly.
Next, consider the perspective of national author-
ities that have to deal with these implications if emer-
gency liquidity is centralized (risk-shared) and deposit 
insurance is centralized. The incentives change sub-
stantially: now it is up to European authorities to deal 
with troubled banks, deposit insurance, and emer-
gency liquidity. In other words, they are called upon to 
adopt the role previously held by national authorities. 
This would arguably greatly reduce the abovemen-
tioned resistance of national authorities to the way 
banks expand and to how resources are allocated 
across jurisdictions. 
In sum, the risks (and costs) of cross-border bank-
ing typically accrue more to supervisors and, ulti-
mately, taxpayers. Quite often, the resistance to 
cross-border expansion of activities comes from actors 
that might have to bear the costs should circumstances 
take a turn for the worse. Conflicts of interest between 
stakeholders in the home and host countries in these 
situations are almost inevitable (Eisenbeis and Kauf-
man 2008). As discussed above, there are multiple ten-
sions between home and host authorities that are not 
easy to address and that raise challenges to cross-bor-
der integration. 
Would completing the banking union fully address 
these tensions? To entirely eliminate them, the inter-
ests of all the parties involved in regulation, supervi-
sion, and resolution would have to be aligned. Ulti-
mately, this means aligning the interests of all taxpayers 
represented by these authorities. At its current stage, 
the banking union anchored on the two pillars of super-
vision and resolution is, in our view, insufficient to fully 
align the interests of all those involved. Given that 
financial stability continues to be primarily a national 
responsibility, as taxpayers are called upon to reim-
burse depositors in the event of failure, there remain 
conflicts between home and host authorities, despite 
the huge step made by the two existing pillars of the 
banking union. As discussed before, completing the 
banking union through a common deposit insurance 
scheme, with a common fiscal backstop, would cer-
tainly foster a better alignment of interests. This would 
avoid explicit or implicit barriers or difficulties to entry 
raised by home and, especially, host authorities. It 
would also avoid shifts in depositors’ allocation deci-
sions based on the perceived credibility of deposit 
insurance.
However, the million-dollar question is if complet-
ing the banking union will necessarily lead to more 
cross-border banking in Europe. Are the restrictions 
imposed by supervisors and regulators so severe that 
banks are discouraged from pursuing profitable busi-
ness opportunities across borders? Or does this reluc-
tance arise from banks’ incentives—or lack thereof?
Several other factors may be hindering cross-bor-
der bank integration in Europe: legacy assets from the 
crisis that create uncertainty in valuation; obstacles to 
the free flow of capital and liquidity of banking groups; 
subdued economic growth prospects; overbanking, 
which is more likely to lead to deleveraging than to 
expansion; and a lack of harmonization in some legal 
and fiscal dimensions, most notably the insolvency 
codes (Hartmann et al. 2017; Emter et al. 2018; Guindos 
2018). How these business and regulatory obstacles 
interact with those emerging from an incomplete bank-
ing union is a question that remains unanswered.
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liquidation of banks and deposit insurance. Such an 
institution, say, an EDIC (European Deposit Insurance 
Corporation), would be a game changer for the banking 
union (Ferreira 2018).
Further, one should also stress that the ECB is not 
the lender of last resort for banks in the euro area. 
National central banks are still responsible for the pro-
vision of emergency liquidity assistance to banks, 
which may occur if banks do not have enough collateral 
to pledge with the ECB in regular refinancing opera-
tions. In such a case, there is no risk-sharing at the 
Eurosystem level, which means that potentially large 
losses associated with this assistance are borne by 
sovereigns. 
A truly European system for dealing with troubled 
banks, together with risk-shared emergency liquidity 
assistance, would arguably promote, or reduce opposi-
tion to, the expansion of multinational banks through 
branches. This would make the jurisdiction of origin 
less relevant for most purposes. Whether further legal 
changes would be needed to smooth out national idio-
syncrasies, in particular  regarding liquidation, is an 
open question.
On the other hand, failure to deepen the banking 
union and to maintain flexibility in banking crises man-
agement is quite perilous in the context of an economic 
downturn. It is unclear whether the partial reforms 
taken are enough to enhance or even guarantee the 
financial stability of the European Union (and of the 
euro area in particular).  
Finally, it seems also important to leave open the 
possibility of more direct involvement in banks at the 
EU level. While avoiding taxpayer involvement is a legit-
imate concern of policy makers, it is not clear that the 
current paradigm of bank resolution could survive a 
moderate crisis insofar as financial stability may be 
jeopardized.
IS THE LACK OF COMMON DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
AND OVERALL INCOMPLETENESS OF THE BANK-
ING UNION A BARRIER TO BANK CONSOLIDATION 
AND CROSS-BORDER EXPANSION?
There are many benefits associated with cross-border 
bank expansion. It fosters competition and efficiency, 
and mitigates risk through geographical and sectoral 
diversification (Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2008, Hart-
mann et al. 2017). From a political economy viewpoint, 
this is a natural step in European integration. Recently, 
there have been calls from several European institu-
tions, including the ECB and the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), to foster bank consolidation in 
Europe.5 Implementation of the SSM and the Single 
Resolution Board should have fostered some addi-
tional integration. However, when we look at the data, 
the level of integration in the European banking sector 
remains subdued and has not changed significantly 
5  See for example speeches by Nouy (2017) or Guindos (2018).
since the start of the banking union. What is stopping 
European banks from further integration? What, in par-
ticular, is the role of the missing pillar in the completion 
of the banking union: a common deposit insurance 
scheme? 
As discussed above, the lack of a common deposit 
insurance scheme in the banking union (together with 
an eminently national lender of last resort for banks) 
significantly alters the incentives of national authori-
ties with regard to the operation of cross-border banks. 
For example, national authorities will tend to encour-
age the cross-border expansion of domestic banks 
through subsidiaries (entities independent of the par-
ent bank) and not through branches (entities depend-
ent on the parent bank). This is because national 
authorities do not guarantee deposits from and do not 
provide emergency liquidity assistance to subsidiaries; 
i.e., they do not assume the risks of those international 
operations. They also welcome the limited liability 
aspect of such operations, in a context where proper 
supervision may be difficult. With proper supervision, 
however, the risk-sharing aspect of international oper-
ations could potentially outweigh the costs. For exam-
ple, a shock to the domestic economy that leads to 
losses in loan portfolios and to potential limitations on 
the credit supply could be offset by the international 
operations. But such benefits are perhaps perceived as 
limited, since the bias of national authorities towards 
favoring expansion through subsidiaries is quite evi-
dent. Also, national authorities may resist the estab-
lishment of foreign bank branches if those branches are 
relatively large or have local systemic importance.
There have been recent proposals—in the context 
of the revision of the Capital Requirements Regulation 
and Directive—towards making the operation of inter-
national banks through subsidiaries more similar to an 
operation based on branches. This makes it closer to a 
truly European operation, independent to some extent 
of national idiosyncrasies and mimicking the expan-
sion through branches. The idea is that this promotes 
risk-sharing and helps create pan-European banks that 
are less dependent on the country of origin. The pro-
posals amount to relaxing liquidity and capital require-
ments for subsidiaries—provided these requirements 
are met at the group level—so as to promote the reallo-
cation of resources across jurisdictions. In turn, this 
would increase the efficiency of the operation, contrib-
uting to some degree of risk-sharing across countries. 
However, some national authorities tend to oppose 
such alleviation of liquidity and capital requirements 
for subsidiaries, and are inclined to limit potential 
intragroup exposures using so-called national options 
and discretion. More generally, national authorities 
tend to mitigate the risks associated with those institu-
tions and to resist any transfer of supervisory tools and 
resolution powers. This is understandable, as the 
potential for transferring risks to the respective juris-
diction is real and the sovereign is still the ultimate 
guarantor of financial stability through deposit insur-
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